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21 Introduction
Monetary policy plays a key role in managing economic ￿ uctuations. For that reason,
understanding the conduct of monetary policy is of considerable interest. Essentially,
monetary policy making is an intricate process where a monetary authority gathers an
extensive set of relevant economic information before delivering its policy action. This fact
makes e⁄orts for tracking the true representation of monetary policy very complicated.
Therefore, a question about whether or not a simple representation can approximate the
true conduct of monetary policy becomes relevant. A simple representation of monetary
policy, although it may not be very precise, can help in understanding the conduct of
monetary policy and provide pictures about possible directions of any future monetary
policy stance.
To help in understanding such issues, the literature has sought a simple characterisation
of policy reaction functions in order to summarise the monetary authority￿ s behaviour
in setting policy. A common successful simpli￿cation is generally known as the Taylor
(1993) type of rule. In this type of rule, the monetary policy stance is typically seen to be
driven by ￿ uctuations of in￿ ation around its long-run steady state target and ￿ uctuations
in measures of the economic cyclical variable (normally represented by the output-gap).
Existing literature in this area has shown that variants of the Taylor type rule have done
reasonably well in explaining changes in the direction of monetary policy in developed
economy cases.1
While the above approach has been relatively successful for approximating monetary policy
in the more advanced economies, little is known on the outcome of a similar exercise in
developing economies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the simple monetary
policy reaction function in the case of ￿ve ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in order to understand the setting of monetary policy
in the region and to identify the key drivers behind it. To serve this objective, we estimate
a general form of the simple policy reaction function for each of the economies using a
sample of quarterly data spanning 1989 to 2004.
One of the challenges faced for conducting the above exercise is the fact that monetary
authorities in ASEAN make use of di⁄erent tools and approaches to implement monetary
policy. To reconcile the issue, this paper will justify the inclusion of the key interest rate
as a common proxy for the policy variable of those economies. Another important issue is
that most of the sample countries report shifts in their adopted monetary regime during
the chosen sample period. Since the dates for those potential shifts are predetermined,
the paper also presents the estimates of policy reaction functions using sub-samples that
start or end around those known dates for each case and investigate if the shifts are clearly
re￿ ected in the data.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the nature of
monetary policy in each of the economies in the sample. Section 3 o⁄ers a justi￿cation for
the choice of proxy for the policy instrument and presents the methodology adopted to
1For example, Clarida et al. (1998) for the case of six major economies, Taylor (1999) and Clarida et
al. (2000) for the US case, Nelson (2000) for the UK case, and de Brouwer and Gilbert (2005) for the case
of Australia.
3conduct the estimation. Section 4 outlines the data set and discusses the issues surrounding
it. Section 5 reports and evaluates the ￿ndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy in ASEAN-5 Countries: A Brief De-
scription
The conduct of monetary policy in most of the ￿ve ASEAN countries under consideration
has varied during the last two decades. This variation is mainly in response to the 1997
Asian ￿nancial crisis, and can clearly be seen in those economies that were hit the hardest
by the crisis (like Indonesia and Thailand). For the economies where the impact of the
crisis was not as severe (like Singapore and the Philippines), the changes are less obvious.
This section provides a brief general description of the development of monetary policy in
those countries within the relevant time period.
2.1 Indonesia
The ultimate goal of Bank Indonesia (BI ￿the central bank of Indonesia) has always been
to achieve and maintain stability in the value of its currency (Rupiah). During the pre-
crisis period, BI adopted a crawling peg exchange rate regime to achieve this goal.2 Severe
depreciation pressure in the crisis period forced BI to abandon the exchange rate regime
and adopt a freer regime within a tighter base money targeting framework. This was done
to restore con￿dence in the currency and to tame in￿ ation. In achieving the base money
target, BI relies upon open market operations through the sale of BI certi￿cates (SBI).
Institutionally, there was also a major change in the conduct of monetary policy in Indone-
sia in the post-crisis period. In 1999 a new central banking law was enacted establishing
the independence of BI.3 The act obliges BI to set an in￿ ation target every year and direct
monetary policy to achieve it. In other words, the act has directed BI to adopt an in￿ ation
targeting type of framework. Lately, the operating target in conducting monetary policy
has also shifted from base money targeting to targeting an interest rate (the 30-day SBI
rate).
2.2 Malaysia
Price stability that provides a supportive environment for promoting a sustainable level
of economic activity is the ultimate objective of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM ￿the cen-
tral bank of Malaysia). To accomplish this objective, the BNM monetary policy strategy
prior to the mid-1990s had been based on targeting monetary aggregates. The strategy
was internal in the sense that it was not formally announced to the public, where BNM
in￿ uenced the day-to-day volume of liquidity in the money market to be consistent with
its monetary growth target. Large capital in￿ ows and their reversal in the early 1990s,
2Based on the classi￿cation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Indonesia is categorised as
having adopted a managed ￿ oating exchange rate regime at that time. However, the Rupiah exchange rate
was practically ￿xed to the US dollar with a ￿xed depreciation rate normally announced once a year.
3See Bank Indonesia (2000) for further explanation.
4however, is considered to be creating instability in the monetary aggregates, which was
then used as a target by the bank (Cheong, 2005). Consequently, towards the mid-1990s,
BNM shifted its focus from monetary targeting to interest rate targeting. For the oper-
ational policy target, BNM uses the 3-month interbank rate. As for the exchange rate
regime, BNM is then categorised by the IMF as a managed ￿ oater. The Malaysian ringgit
exchange rate is set to be free within some unannounced band and the BNM intervenes
whenever needed.
In response to the Asian ￿nancial crisis, the ringgit exchange rate was ￿xed in the late
1998 coupled with an imposition of a selective capital control in order to provide BNM
with greater monetary autonomy in in￿ uencing domestic interest rates to support the
economic recovery.4 In July 2005, however, BNM has shifted back to adopting a managed
￿ oat exchange rate regime for the Malaysian ringgit.
2.3 The Philippines
The primary objective of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP ￿ the central bank of the
Philippines) monetary policy is to maintain price stability that is conducive for balanced
and sustainable growth of the economy. BSP has gained its monetary policy independence
since around 1986. Starting from January 2002, BSP has also o¢ cially adopted an in￿ ation
targeting framework for its monetary policy regime. As for the exchange rate regime, BSP
has been categorised as an independent ￿ oater.
To achieve the primary objective of its monetary policy, BSP adopted a strict monetary
targeting framework until mid-1995. This was done on the basis of the perceived stable and
predictable relationship between the monetary target and the ultimate target of monetary
policy. The operating objective was to target M3 by manipulating base money as the
policy instrument. As this perceived stable relationship started to become questionable,
BSP gradually shifted its monetary policy framework in 1995. The new monetary policy
framework at that time was to complement monetary aggregate targeting with some form
of in￿ ation targeting. Later on, more weight was put on the latter. Following the changes,
the policy instrument was also gradually adjusted from quantity targeting to targeting the
interest rate.5
2.4 Singapore
The primary objective for the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is to promote
price stability to ensure low in￿ ation as a sound basis for sustainable economic growth.
In accomplishing its objective, MAS has adopted a unique monetary policy framework by
centering on exchange rate management rather than managing the money supply or the
interest rate. Since 1981, MAS has managed the Singapore dollar exchange rate against an
undisclosed trade-weighted basket of currencies of Singapore￿ s major trading partners and
competitors.6 The composition of this basket is being periodically reviewed and revised
4As argued by Kim and Lee (2004), imposition of capital control and a ￿xed exchange rate regime may
still provide independence for a central bank from an international in￿ uence.
5See Lamberte (2002) for the more detailed discussion.
6See, among others, discussions in Parrado (2004) and McCallum (2006).
5to take into account changes in Singapore￿ s trade patterns. However, details concerning
the index and the boundaries of the target band are not disclosed. The extent of any
appreciation or depreciation depends mainly on the expected in￿ ationary pressures and
the MAS intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent excessive ￿ uctuations in
the exchange rate.
The justi￿cation of this unique behaviour lies primarily in the characteristics of Singapore￿ s
economy being small and open. In such a case, the exchange rate is deemed to be an ideal
intermediate target for monetary policy to maintain price stability. The high degree of
￿nancial openness and sensitivity of capital ￿ ows to interest rate di⁄erentials makes it
di¢ cult to target either money supply or interest rates in Singapore. Net ￿ ows of funds
from abroad account for the bulk of changes in domestic money supply and domestic
interest rates are largely determined by foreign rates and market expectations on the
future strength of the Singapore dollar.
2.5 Thailand
Unlike the other central banks in the region, the Bank of Thailand (BoT ￿the central
bank of Thailand) does not carry an explicit statement of its primary objective in its Bank
of Thailand act. In practice, however, maintaining monetary and ￿nancial stability for
achieving sustainable economic growth has always been the primary goal of the BoT. On
top of that, the BoT has also announced the adoption of explicit in￿ ation targeting in
May 2000.
To achieve its goal the BoT￿ s monetary policy framework can be divided into three di⁄erent
episodes. Before the 1997 ￿nancial crisis, the BoT adopted the pegged exchange rate
regime as the anchor of its monetary policy.7 Unlike the Indonesian case, however, the
value of the Baht against the US dollar was announced and defended on a daily basis
rather than being determined annually.
The 1997 crisis forced the BoT to ￿ oat the exchange rate and adopt monetary targeting
for conducting its monetary policy. As in the case for the pegged exchange rate adopted
previously, liquidity management was also conducted on the daily basis to ensure against
excessive volatility in interest rates and liquidity in the ￿nancial system. In May 2000, the
BoT made an extensive reappraisal of both the domestic and the external environment,
and concluded to move on to adopting the in￿ ation targeting framework in conducting
monetary policy.8 The main cause for this change was an assessment that the relationship
between money supply and output growth has become less stable, especially in the period
after the major crisis where the uncertainty in credit extensions as well as the rapidly
changing ￿nancial sector took place in Thailand. Under this framework, the BoT imple-
ments its monetary policy by in￿ uencing short-term money market rates via its key policy
rate, the 14-day repurchase rate.
7See, for example, discussion in Phuvanatnaranubala (2005).
8See, among others, discussions in Devakula (2001) and in Phuvanatnaranubala (2005).
63 The Monetary Policy Reaction Function
3.1 Approximating monetary policy
Identifying monetary policy is not an easy task. Not only do di⁄erent monetary authorities
adopt di⁄erent operating targets in conducting their policy, but the adopted operating
target itself often varies over time. This situation points to the identifying monetary policy
problem, where it is hard to ￿nd a consensus on how to measure the size and direction of
changes in monetary policy (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). In dealing with the issue, various
measures for representing monetary policy have been utilised in the empirical literature.
They cover the range of operating targets commonly used by monetary authorities; i.e.
monetary aggregates (quantity targeting), short-term interest rates (price targeting) and,
in some cases, exchange rates.
Under the condition where an economic system operates with certainty, there is no con￿ ict
between using the quantity targeting or price targeting as an instrument for conducting
monetary policy. On the other hand, when uncertainty is introduced into the picture, the
choice of policy instrument matters in determining the best outcome for monetary policy
(Poole, 1970). This may be one of the reasons why, in practice, monetary authorities tend
to alter their operating instruments to cope with the relevant economic challenges that they
are facing. On practical grounds, however, Goodfriend (1991) and Goodhart (1995) argue
that regardless of what monetary regime a monetary authority claims it follows, the actual
implementation of monetary policy can be approximated by looking at how a monetary
authority sets the short-term interest rate. It is argued that a policy that actually targets
the short-term interest rate can better deal with the short-run variability of the velocity of
money and provide an achoring function to prices in the assets market.9 For this reason,
the short-run interest rate has been most widely used to proxy the monetary policy stance
in recent theoretical and empirical literature.10
As discussed in the previous section, the operating target for conducting monetary policy
in the ASEAN-5 countries has also varied in the last decades. In many cases, the exact
form of the monetary policy instrument is also rarely transparent. These situations create
di¢ culties for obtaining a precise measure of monetary policy for all of the observation
period. To deal with this problem, following the approach commonly found in the current
literature, the relevant short-term interest rate for the selected ASEAN countries is used
to approximate the monetary policy stance in this paper.
The preference to model a monetary policy reaction function using the interest type rule
is basically due to the ability of this model to track real data well, according to the
empirical literature.11 Furthermore, the relationship between the three candidate proxies
of the operating target for monetary policy (monetary aggregates, interest rate and the
exchange rate) have been relatively well de￿ned by the theory. The monetary authority
cannot ￿x both money and interest rates at the same time. Once the monetary authority
9Further arguments from central bankers point of view can also be found in, for example, Poole (1991).
10See for example Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Clarida et al. (1998; 2000), de Brouwer and Gilbert
(2005), Nelson (2000);etc. for the empirical literature and Woodford (2003), etc. for the theoretical
foundation.
11See the empirical literature in the footnote above as an example.
7has chosen one as an instrument, the other becomes a variable. A similar argument applies
to the choice between interest rate and exchange rate. If exchange rate is ￿xed by the
authority, then interest rate will have to adjust whenever needed to keep the exchange
rate intact. Another reason for focusing on interest rate rather than changes in monetary
aggregates is the potential inadequacy of the latter to represent the true policy stance due
to its dependence on a variety of non-monetary policy in￿ uences. As a monetary authority
typically prefers to smooth ￿ uctuations of the interest rate, decisions to change the stock
of monetary aggregates may be taken to accommodate innovations in money demand.
Therefore, changes in monetary aggregates may not be followed by corresponding changes
in interest rates. In other words, changes in monetary aggregates may re￿ ect changes in
both its supply and demand components without necessarily re￿ ecting changes in a policy
stance.
Following the above arguments, this paper attempts to approximate monetary policy for
the selected economies by estimating the interest rate type rule. Given this decision, the
case of Singapore needs some further attention. As discussed earlier, the Singaporean
monetary authority has been consistently running its monetary policy by managing the
Singapore dollar exchange rate against an undisclosed trade-weighted basket of curren-
cies of Singapore￿ s major trading partners and competitors since 1981. Consequently,
exchange rate targeting would be the most appropriate representation of monetary policy
in Singapore. McCallum (2006) stresses that the exchange rate targeting employed by the
MAS is fundamentally di⁄erent from a traditional ￿xed exchange rate arrangement. The
MAS, he argues, manages the exchange rate as its monetary policy instrument rather than
short-term interest rate.
To study the conduct of monetary policy in Singapore, Parrado (2004) estimates a variant
of the Taylor type rule with changes in the trade weighted index (TWI) of exchange rate
as the operating target variable. The estimated equation takes the following form:
￿et = ￿￿et￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿t+n + ￿xt) + "t (1)
where ￿et is the change in TWI at time t; ￿t+n is the in￿ ation rate at time t+n; xt is the
measure of the output gap at time t; ￿;￿ ;￿ and ￿ are the relevant parameters that will
be discussed further in the next subsection; and "t is the residual term with E ("t) = 0.
To maintain comparability with the other economies in the sample, this study will instead
approximate the monetary policy in Singapore by taking interest rate as the instrument
for monetary policy. This strategy is justi￿ed by exploiting the uncovered interest parity
(UIP) relation as follows:
it = i￿ + Et￿et+1 + ￿t (2)
where it is the domestic nominal interest rate at time t; i￿ is the exogenous foreign interest
rate; and Et is the expectation operator taken at time t. ￿t is a term introduced to capture
the possibility of any short-term distortion that could potentially distort the parity. For





and is intertemporally independent, so that the
parity holds in expectation.
Combining equation (1) and the UIP relation above we end up with the following rela-
8tionship:
it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿t+n+1 + ￿xt+1) + (i￿ ￿ ￿i￿) + ut (3)
where ut = ￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1. The relationship in (3) is similar to a variant of interest rule
type of equation which will be discussed in more detail in the following subsection. The
di⁄erences, however, lie in the additional term (i￿ ￿ ￿i￿) and the potentially non-zero
cov (ut;ut￿1).
3.2 The reaction function: Speci￿cation and estimation strategy
There are several di⁄erent strategies that can be pursued in order to obtain a policy re-
action function. To obtain a prescriptive form of a reaction function for example, Fuhrer
(1997) estimated a small SVAR model for the United States economy and derives the
optimal rule from the model. de Brouwer and O￿ Regan (1997) derives an optimal policy
rule from a small structural model of the Australian economy. Another example would be
Filosa (2001) who derives a modi￿ed Taylor rule for a number of the developing countries.
However, since this strategy tends to produce a prescriptive policy rule for the policy mak-
ers rather than tracing back the historical conduct of monetary policy, the methodology
is not really suitable in serving the purpose of this study.
Another approach for getting a policy rule is by estimating the general (baseline) spec-
i￿cation of a policy reaction function using a historical data set of the economy under
consideration. In particular, it focuses on the possibility of monetary authorities in small
open developing economies adhering to the Taylor type interest rule12 in delivering their
past policy conduct. This type of policy rule typically assumes that policy makers respond
to the development in the deviation between in￿ ation from its target level and the out-
put gap. To progress with the estimation, there are at least two di⁄erent strategies that
can be pursued. The ￿rst would be to estimate the Taylor type policy reaction function
(also known as the backward-looking rule). The second would be by estimating a similar
speci￿cation but using the forward-looking assumption.
The backward-looking speci￿cation, however, is often criticised for neglecting one im-
portant aspect of monetary policy making in the real world; that is its forward-looking
perspective. It is argued that instead of looking at the current or lagged values of in￿ ation
and output, policy makers in practice tend to base their policy decisions on expectations of
future values of those variables. Clarida et al. (1998) propose an estimable methodology
to deal with this forward-looking policy reaction function and have demonstrated that
their methodology works well in evaluating the monetary policy behaviour in G7 coun-
tries. Batini and Haldane (1999b; 1999a) and de Brouwer and Gilbert (2005) ￿nd that this
forward-looking speci￿cation performs better in evaluating the monetary policy behaviour
relative to the backward-looking one. For that reason, the policy reaction functions in
this study are estimated based on the forward-looking assumption and the methodology
adopted closely follows that proposed by Clarida et al. (1998; 2000).
12Known also as the Bryant et al. (1993) rule. This rule is classi￿ed as more general in terms of
speci￿cation, where the Taylor rule is considered as one of the variants. See discussion in de Brouwer and
Gilbert (2005).
9The speci￿cation for the baseline policy rule takes a simple form. Within each of its
operating periods, a monetary authority is assumed to set the nominal interest target rate ￿
e i
￿
based on developments in the expected in￿ ation around its target and the output gap.
e it = ￿ { + ￿1 [Et (￿t+n j ￿t) ￿ ￿￿] + ￿2Et (xt+q j ￿t) (4)
where ￿ { can be interpreted as the long-run equilibrium level of the nominal rate; ￿￿ is the
long-run in￿ ation target; x is the output gap that serves as a measure of cyclical variable;
and ￿t is the set of information available to the monetary authority at the time they
set interest rates. Clarida et al. (1998) also entertain an extension of the baseline model
by allowing for a possibility for other variables (such as exchange rate, money growth,
international interest rate, etc.) to a⁄ect the target rate explicitly. That is:
e it = ￿ { + ￿1 [Et (￿t+n j ￿t) ￿ ￿￿] + ￿2Et (xt+q j ￿t) + ￿3Et (zt+k j ￿t) (5)
where z denotes the other variable a⁄ecting the target policy rate.
The policy reaction function outlined in (4) or (5) is acknowledged to be too restrictive
for describing the actual movement in the policy rate.13 It is restrictive in the sense
that (i) the functional form in both (4) or (5) assumes that the target rate will adjust
immediately to developments of the a⁄ecting variables (regardless of the magnitude); (ii)
they represent the systematic response of a monetary authority to the development in the
economy without acknowledging a possibility of randomness in the policy action; and (iii)
they assume that a monetary authority has perfect control over the interest rate.
Abrupt and frequent changes in the policy rate could disrupt the capital market and
consume the credibility of a monetary authority. Since credibility is very important for
a monetary authority, it then typically prefers to smooth the movements in interest rate.
To avoid a loss of credibility from impulsive large changes in the policy instrument, it
is further assumed that a monetary authority smooths the interest rate by adjusting it
partially to the target:
it = (1 ￿ ￿i)e it + ￿iit￿1 + vt (6)
where it is the actual interest rate at time t; ￿i is the partial adjustment coe¢ cient that
captures the degree of interest rate smoothing; and vt is the error term introduced to
capture randomness in policy action and the fact that a monetary authority does not have
perfect control over interest rate. The intuition behind such an adjustment scheme is that
the authority does not adjust the interest rate fully according to its desired current target
level, but taking some linear combination between its desired target level and the past
value of the interest rate to smooth its movement.
Substituting (4) into (6) to obtain an estimable equation for the policy reaction function
gives us the following:
it = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿1￿t+n + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿2xt+q + ￿iit￿1 + &t (7)
13See Clarida et al. (2000).
10where,
￿i = ￿ { ￿ ￿1￿￿
and,
&t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿i)f[￿1￿t+n ￿ Et (￿t+n j ￿t)] + ￿2 [xt+q ￿ Et (xt+q j ￿t)]g + vt
with Et (&t) = 0. The later term (&t) is a linear combination of the forecast errors of
in￿ ation, the output gap and the exogenous disturbance vt.
Once the estimable functional form is established, the next step would be to determine
a vector of instrumental variables (ut; ut 2 ￿t and orthogonal to &t) that includes the
monetary authority￿ s information set at the time they choose the interest rate. That
is the elements of ut need also to be uncorrelated with vt and hence Et(&t j ut) = 0.
The last condition provides a basis for estimating the vector of unknown parameters h
￿1 ￿2 ￿i ￿i
i0
by using the generalised method of moments (GMM) with an opti-
mal weighting matrix that accounts for possible serial correlation in &t.14
In order to estimate the relation set out in (7), the sample period from which the data
are obtained needs to contain su¢ cient variations in the variables involved and, also, be
su¢ ciently long to fairly identify the slope coe¢ cients in the policy reaction function.
Clarida et al. (2000) also maintain a stationary assumption for both nominal interest
rate and in￿ ation in order to be able to work out the long-run in￿ ation target for their
estimates by imposing an additional restriction. The next section will discuss the above
requirements for the case of the ASEAN-5 countries.
Additional notes are needed for Singapore￿ s case concerning the situation explained in the
earlier subsection. To estimate Singapore￿ s policy reaction function using interest rate
by exploiting the UIP condition leaves us with an extra term. If we are sure about the
currency reference used in its exchange rate management policy, then i￿ is identi￿ed in
principle. In that case one can estimate the PRF using the di⁄erential between domestic
and foreign interest rate (it ￿ i￿
t) as the dependent variable. However, in the case where
the currency reference is unclear, identi￿cation for i￿ becomes di¢ cult. In that case, one
can proceed in estimating (7) by at least imposing two alternative assumptions. If one
is willing to assume i￿ to be constant, then the term can be lumped in to the constant
term of the equation. If i￿ is not constant over time, but (i￿ ￿ ￿i￿) series is stationary,
then its constant component could be captured in the constant term of the policy reaction
function and its remainder would be part of the error term in the function. Since the term
is stationary, then the stochastic component of it will also be stationary. Therefore, the
residuals from the estimated policy reaction function will still appear to be stationary.
14See Favero (2001, pp. 222-225) for a more detailed explanation.
114 Data
To estimate the approximate monetary policy reaction function, the analysis is conducted
using quarterly data starting from 1989 to 2004.15 This particular period is chosen since
most of the countries analysed underwent signi￿cant structural changes in their economy
during the 1980s. These structural changes were also accompanied by signi￿cant policy
variation. Indonesia for example, underwent two signi￿cant banking and ￿nancial sector
deregulations in the 1980s. Similar changes also occurred in Malaysia where BNM dereg-
ulated the interest rate structure of the banking system throughout the early 1980s. To
avoid too many potential breaks in the policy regime, the analysis is conducted with the
beginning of the 1990s as a starting point.
Following from the explanation in the earlier section, variables considered for the analysis
are the short-term nominal interest rate, consumer price indices (CPIs), real output and
the relevant exchange rate. Most of the data are taken from the CEIC Asia database
except for the TWI of exchange rate data for Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines,
which are taken from the IMF estimates in the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database.16 Real output data for Malaysia and Indonesia before 1991 and 1993, respec-
tively, are obtained from their central banks. Details about data are provided in Appendix
A.
4.1 Interest rates
In this paper, interest rates are treated as the proxy for the policy variable. Following
the current policy rate, the 30-day SBI rate is used for Indonesia, the 90-day Manila
reference rate for the Philippines and the 14-day repo rate for Thailand. Although the
current policy target rate for Malaysia is the 3-month interbank rate, this study uses the
3-month treasury bills (TB) discount rate instead. This proxy is chosen because of the
data availability from the CEIC database. The interbank rate is only available starting
from 1996 in the version where the data are obtained, while the TB discount rate data are
available for the whole period under consideration. Nevertheless, the correlation between
the two series during the period where both series are available is very high (about 97 per
cent). Lastly, the 3-month interbank rate is used as a proxy for Singapore substituting
the actual policy target TWI. Appendix A.1 provides the graphs of each country￿ s interest
rates and reports the statistical results for their stationarity tests.
Interest rates for the ￿ve ASEAN countries under consideration share similar patterns over
the sample period. They tend to start o⁄higher in the beginning of the sample and tend to
be relatively lower towards the end. In other words, there seems to be a decreasing trend
in the nominal interest rates in the region. This tendency, however, does not appear to be
pronounced in the case of Indonesia, which, together with the Philippines, has a relatively
higher average rate than its neighbours. Another shared feature is the interest rate jump
around the period of the East Asian ￿nancial crisis. Indonesia, the economy that was
15An exception applies for Thailand￿ s case where the quarterly output data is only available starting
from 1993.
16The real e⁄ective exchange rate estimates for Indonesia and Thailand are unavailable. For the two
countries we use the domestic currency exchange rate to the US dollar instead.
12hit hardest by the crisis, experienced the highest jump (reaching about 6 times higher
than its average rate), while other countries were experiencing about a 2 to 3 times higher
jump relative to their average rates. An exception for this observation is the Philippines.
Although it experienced an interest rate increase during the period, the level ￿ uctuated
closely around its sample period average. This observation accentuates the argument that
unlike its neighbouring countries in the region, the Philippines￿economy was not disturbed
much by the crisis.
To test for stationarity of the series along the sample period, two tests are conducted; i.e.
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root in a series (Dickey and Fuller, 1979)
and the KPSS test for stationarity of a series (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). The KPSS test is
conducted to complement the ADF test for unit root, which is deemed to have low power
against its relevant alternative of non-unit root in the series. The results for both tests
to the interest rate series are reported in Appendix A.1. All of the interest rate series
are found to be stationary during the sample period according to the KPSS test, but
Singapore and Thailand data are only found to reject the unit root hypothesis marginally,
based on the ADF test. The tests also con￿rm the observation about the decreasing trend
in the series. The SBI rate series for Indonesia is found to be stationary during the sample
period, while all of the other series are found to be trend stationary.
4.2 In￿ ation rates
To proxy the in￿ ation rate, this study uses year on year changes in the consumer price
index (CPI) series. In￿ ation is calculated as the di⁄erence between the log value of today￿ s
CPI and the log value of its fourth quarter lag. The in￿ ation rate series shares similar
general observations with the nominal interest rate series. As also observed in the nominal
interest rate series, the region￿ s in￿ ation series displays a decreasing trend over the sample
period. This tendency, again, appears to be less pronounced for the case of Indonesia. The
series also experiences jumps during the ￿nancial crisis period. Together with the general
observation in the nominal interest rate series, this observation suggests that the movement
in the nominal interest rate in the region tends to be correlated with the movement in
in￿ ation rate.
The stationarity tests conducted (as reported in Appendix A.2) also support the general
observation made on the decreasing tendency in in￿ ation rate over the sample period.
Both tests conclude that Indonesia￿ s in￿ ation rate is stationary, while the rest are trend
stationary. Note however, that in the case of Malaysia this conclusion is only accepted
relatively marginally.
4.3 Exchange rates
The exchange rate variable is measured as its annual percentage changes by taking the
di⁄erence between its current log values and its fourth quarter lag. This paper uses the
TWI of exchange rate from the IFS to measure the relative exchange rate changes for
the cases where data are available, namely Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. For
Thailand and Indonesia, since the series are not available, the exchange rate with respect
13to the US dollar is used instead. The utilisation of TWI is considered to be preferable
since, particularly for the case of Singapore and Malaysia, the variable is the working
exchange rate variable considered by the monetary authority. As a caveat, however, the
TWI does not necessarily represent the true working variable that those authorities are
using since in practice the actual weights are not publicly announced.
As reported in Appendix A.3, all the annual changes in the exchange rate measure ap-
pear to be stationary and only the series for Singapore appear to be stationary around a
(decreasing) trend. The latter may appear due to the role of the TWI in Singapore that
serves the means for an actual operating instrument of its monetary policy.
4.4 Measuring the output gap
Due to the unobservable nature of the potential output, measuring the output gap has
almost always been a di¢ cult task. The task is even more problematic in the case of
developing economies. For the case of Asian economies, only few empirical research e⁄orts
have been conducted in providing an appropriate measure for the output gap, e.g. Coe
and McDermott (1996) and Gerlach and Yiu (2004). As noted by the earlier studies, the
time series behaviour for the real output in the Asian economies may di⁄er from the other
advanced economies and they also have been exposed to large disturbances, particularly
during the crisis period in the late 1990s.
Taking the above situation into account, Gerlach and Yiu (2004) compare estimates of the
output gap for selected Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan) produced by di⁄erent purely statistical methodolo-
gies; namely, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ￿lter, the band-pass (BP) ￿lter, the Beveridge-
Nelson (BN) ￿lter and the unobservable components (UC) time series approach. They
arrived at a conclusion that estimating the output gap in Asian countries does not appear
to be more di¢ cult than in other advanced economies. This conclusion is due to general
similarities in the results ￿that match well with the common perceptions of economic
￿ uctuations for their sample economies ￿obtained from those di⁄erent methods. Addi-
tionally, the HP and BP ￿lters, and the UC method generate relatively similar estimates
of the output gaps. Therefore, it suggests that the three approaches produce estimates
that contain relatively the same information for variables that policy makers are interested
in.
4.4.1 Estimating potential output
Following the conclusions from Gerlach and Yiu (2004), this study employs the HP ￿lter
method to estimate the unobserved potential output for the ￿ve ASEAN countries. The
HP ￿lter is applied directly to the seasonally adjusted series for the case of Malaysia, Sin-
gapore and the Philippines.17 This treatment is applied by considering the fact that those
three economies do not seem to be experiencing a capacity fall during the crisis period.
17A seasonally adjusted series is used to avoid the unnecessary regularities from disturbing the behav-
ioural pattern in the series. For the case of Singapore, the seasonally adjusted series for real output data
is used. For the case of four other economies in the sample, the seasonally adjusted data is not available,
therefore, the real output series is seasonally adjusted using the census X12 seasonal ￿lter.
14For the cases of Indonesia and Thailand, however, the real output series drops severely
right after the crisis. For the case of Indonesia particularly, the estimated growth of cap-
ital stock is around 0 in 1998 and negative in 1999 as shown in Figure 2 in Appendix A.
This observation motivates the possibility of a break in the potential output in Indonesia
around a year after the ￿nancial crisis hit the country. As Thailand was also severely hit
by the crisis, it is assumed to have experienced a similar break in its potential output
around a year after. To approximate the magnitude of the break, the real output is ￿tted
to a linear trend and a dummy variable indicating the starting period of the potential
break (around a year after the date when the crisis hit the country). This dummy appears
to be negative and signi￿cant for both the cases of Indonesia and Thailand. The HP ￿lter
is then applied to estimate the potential output for both countries after adjusting for the
break.
4.4.2 the output gaps
Using the potential output estimates outlined above, the output gap measures are calcu-
lated as the di⁄erence between the log of seasonally adjusted output and its HP ￿ltered
series. The estimates are shown in Figure 6. A thing to note about estimates for Indonesia
and Thailand is that the closing of the gap in 1999 is mainly due to the drop in the trend
of potential output as explained earlier. This may look like a speedy recovery for both
economies, but in fact it is the drop in productive capacity that actually closes up the
gap. As reported in Appendix A.4, all the output gap measures appear to be stationary.
5 Empirical Results
This section reports estimates of the policy reaction function for the ASEAN-5 economies.
It will ￿rst discuss the results obtained from the baseline estimation for all the sample
economies and go into a further discussion of each individual country issues. The baseline
estimates here refer to the estimation results of equation (7) for the entire sample period
considered in this study. Later, in the analysis for the individual economies, the possibility
for a break in the behaviour of the monetary authorities according to their historical
description as discussed in Section 2 is considered.
5.1 Baseline estimates
Estimation of the baseline policy reaction function for each of the sample countries is con-
ducted using the GMM technique by exploiting the most parsimonious set of instruments
for each case.18 In general, the instrument list includes lag values of i;￿;x and annual
change in the exchange rate (￿e) as the underlying information at the time the interest
rates are set. This choice of instruments is motivated by the variables that commonly
appear in a simple structural model of a small open economy. In the estimation, we alter
18Parsimonious selection of the instrument variables is strongly suggested in order for the instruments
to be optimal based on the Monte Carlo simulations by Tauchen (1986) and Kocherlakota (1990). See
Hamilton (1994, pp. 426-27). Instrument variables in this study are picked according to the strength of
correlation between the instrument and the variable it instrumented.
15the target horizon for in￿ ation (n = 0;:::;4) and ￿x the one for the output gap to be equal
to 0. Details for the result of the baseline estimation for the whole sample period are
presented in Appendix B.
For the case of Indonesia, the list of instrument variables used is found to be valid according
to the Hansen J-test for all n. The best19 estimate is obtained at n = 1 and the ￿t
worsens as n gets larger. The e⁄ect of di⁄erent target horizons for in￿ ation is found to be
consistently positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero except for n = 4: The further the
target horizon for in￿ ation in the PRF, the lower is its ability to track the actual movement
in interest rate (the ￿t is actually dropped signi￿cantly at n > 2). It suggests that longer
forecast pro￿les of in￿ ation do not appear to be signi￿cant in explaining movements in
the policy rate. While this situation appears to be dramatic for the case of Indonesia, the
estimate for the other countries does not appear to be as obvious. Unlike in￿ ation, the
measure of the output gap does not appear to be signi￿cant in a⁄ecting the movement
in the policy rate in Indonesia. Not only does the parameter appear to be insigni￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero, but its magnitude also insensibly appears to be negative.
As for the case of Indonesia, the list of instruments used to estimate PRF in Malaysia is
also found to be valid for all n considered. The best estimate in this case is obtained at
n = 1. The e⁄ect of di⁄erent target horizons for in￿ ation are also found to be consistently
positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. However, unlike what is found in the case of
Indonesia, the magnitude of this parameter is found to be relatively stable in this case. The
magnitude of this parameter lies around the value of 1.7. The coe¢ cient on the measure
of the output gap in the case of Malaysia is also found to be positive and signi￿cant up to
n = 1. The weight however, is small relative to the weight put on the forecast of in￿ ation.
The ￿ndings for the case of the Philippines are slightly di⁄erent. In this case, the best
PRF estimate is obtained at n = 1; but based on the Hansen J￿statistics the list of
instruments are only valid for n = 0 and 1. Both the forecast of in￿ ation and the measure
of the output gap are found to have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the interest rate.
However, unlike the other cases, the weight for the output gap dominates in driving the
movement of the interest rate. While the point estimate of the output gap parameter in
the PRF is found to be above 1, the point estimate of the forecast of in￿ ation parameter
is found to be well below 1.
In the case of Singapore, the utilised instrument list is also found to be valid for all n. The
best estimate in this case is obtained at n = 0. For all of the in￿ ation target horizons that
appear to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (the case where n = 0;1 and 4), the point
estimates of the parameters are scattered around the value of one. The point estimates
for parameters of the measure of the output gap also fall near the value of one, except
for the case where n = 1 where the estimated parameter is only marginally signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. This ￿nding indicates that the parameter estimate is relatively stable
given di⁄erent target horizons of in￿ ation.
As discussed earlier, the case of Thailand is estimated using shorter intervals due to data
availability problems. However, the list of instrument variables utilised in this case still
19￿Best￿here is de￿ned according to the highest ￿t obtained from the estimation.
16appears to be valid and the best ￿t is achieved at n = 3. The forecast of in￿ ation appears
to enter the PRF with a positive e⁄ect that is signi￿cantly di⁄erent form zero regardless of
the target horizon considered. The magnitude of the parameter for this variable is found
to be larger than the other cases considered in this study (the point estimate is generally
more than 2 except for the case where n = 0). Similarly to the case of estimated policy
reaction functions for Indonesia, the measure of the output gap does not appear to enter
the function signi￿cantly.
In terms of the degree of the interest rate smoothing, the ￿ndings vary among countries.
The movement of interest rates in Singapore is found to be highly persistent, with ￿i
value around 0.87 to 0.88. The interest rate movements in Thailand and Malaysia are
also found to be relatively persistent, with the weight on the lag interest rate varying
around 0.7 to 0.85 in the case of Thailand and 0.7 for Malaysia. In the case of the
Philipines and Indonesia, the weight for the lag interest rate falls slightly more than one
half. Particularly for the case of Indonesia, however, the interest rate movements become
more and more driven by inertia as we move the forecast horizon for in￿ ation further
ahead. This observation con￿rms that, in the case of Indonesia, further target horizons
for in￿ ation (n ￿ 2) have less explanatory power over the movement in interest rate.
Another general observation out of this exercise is that in most cases ￿i (= ￿ { ￿ ￿￿￿) tends
to come out as insigni￿cant. This observation could arguably come up as a result of the
relatively short sample period for the estimation. Although the sample period contains
su¢ cient variation in the variables considered, we can not ignore the fact that during
that period (except for Indonesia), the interest rate and the in￿ ation series are stationary
around a (decreasing) trend.20
Depending on available external information to assume the value of one of the components
of ￿i; most previous empirical studies on monetary policy reaction functions attempt
to infer either the long-run in￿ ation target or the long-run equilibrium level of nominal
interest rate from the information provided by the estimate of ￿i.21 While uncovering the
value of either￿ { or ￿￿ is a valuable exercise for drawing policy implications, the behaviour of
some variables in the sample period used by this study (particularly nominal interest rate
and in￿ ation) constrain us from conducting similar exercise. The data suggests that some
kind of adjustment towards a lower long-run in￿ ation targets and nominal interest rates
may take place during the sample period considered. For that reason, this paper avoids
identifying the values for either long-run equilibrium interest rate or long-run in￿ ation
target for our sample countries since ￿i from the estimation is not very likely to carry
relevant information concerning the exact value of any of the two variables.
A summary of the best results is presented in Table 1. It reports the summary of the
GMM estimates for each country based on the best ￿t of the results reported in Appendix
B. As indicated earlier, the best ￿t for Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is obtained
at the target horizon for in￿ ation (n) equal to 1; for Singapore it is obtained at n = 0 and
for Thailand at n = 3:
20See appendix A.1 and A.2.
21For example, Clarida et al. (2000) ￿x the US real interest rate target to its observed sample average
to infer the value of ￿
￿; and de Brouwer and Gilbert (2005) instead ￿x ￿
￿ to a given in￿ ation target value
applicable for the case of Australia to back out its neutral nominal interest rate.
17Table 1: Parameters for the baseline estimates of the policy reaction function
Country ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
Indonesia 4.18 1.15 -0.24 0.536 0.893 2.63
(n = 1) (1:62) (0:11) (0:45) (0:05) [0:75]
Malaysia 0.56 1.66 0.19 0.69 0.873 4.31
(n = 1) (0:39) (0:12) (0:05) (0:076) [0:51]
Philippines 0.07 0.72 1.22 0.55 0.791 3.02
(n = 1) (0:01) (0:18) (0:60) (0:12) [0:22]
Singapore 0.82 1.27 0.94 0.85 0.879 6.80
(n = 0) (0:87) (0:49) (0:46) (0:05) [0:34]
Thailand -3.61 2.65 0.09 0.70 0.917 4.13
(n = 3) (0:82) (0:30) (0:24) (0:04) [0:66]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
A number of interesting observations come out in Table 1. First of all, the basic model is
not rejected at the conventional signi￿cance level for any of the cases considered. Further,
the best ￿t GMM estimates of the policy reaction function are able to track the movement
in the interest rate very well as shown by the relatively high adjusted R2 values. The
estimated values of ￿1 have the expected positive sign and are signi￿cant for all cases.
The point estimate of ￿1 is generally > 1, except for the case of the Philippines.22 Where
it is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, the estimated values of ￿2 also tend to have the
expected positive sign. For Singapore and the Philippines, the weight on the output gap
in the policy reaction function is fairly high. In the case of the Philippines, the point
estimate even outweighs the weight for the forecast of in￿ ation. For Malaysia, although
it is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, the weight on the output gap is relatively small, and
for the case of Indonesia and Thailand, the parameter for this variable does not even come
out to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
The estimated ￿gures seem to support the general price stabilising objective of monetary
policy in the considered economies.23 The estimated PRF above shows an indication that
in general the sampled countries share a relatively similar preference by adhering to the
Taylor principle in conducting their monetary policy (￿1 > 1). Following the common
wisdom in the theory, this implies that the monetary policy of these countries has been
stabilising for the economy. That is, monetary policy reacts to expected in￿ ation and
so tends to stabilise ￿ uctuations in both output and in￿ ation. With some caveats in
mind,24 the Philippines seems to be the only exception to these results. Instead of putting
more weight on in￿ ation in driving monetary policy, the results suggest that the authority
in the Philippines put a more than one-to-one weight on the output gap. Nevertheless,
the results reported in Table 1 indicate that a simple Taylor type rule, combined with
an interest smoothing behaviour of the monetary authority, is able to summarise the
22Note, however, that the t-statistics test marginally fails to reject the hypothesis that ￿1 = 1 in the
Philippine￿ s case.
23See, among others, Taylor (1999), Clarida et al. (1999; 2001), and Woodford (2001) for discussions
on the Taylor principle.
24See previous footnote
18behaviour of interest rate setting in the 5 ASEAN economies reasonably well.
Another interesting point to note is that exchange rate does not appear to be explicitly
important in driving the setting of interest rate. It is, however, part of the important
background information utilised by the central bank in determining their monetary pol-
icy stance. An exercise of putting exchange rate measure as an additional explanatory
variable, as in equation (5), does not present any indication that it enters the equation
with a parameter that is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.25 However, the results of the
J-statistics test justify the inclusion of the lag exchange rate as a valid instrument for the
GMM estimation. This ￿nding is in line with the argument of Taylor (2001), in which
he argues that including exchange rate directly into the interest rate rule does not yield
much improvement in the performance of the optimal rule. He further argues that even in
the version of the simple interest rate rule that excludes the exchange rate variable, as in
equation (4), the impact of exchange rate movement is already re￿ ected in the outcome of
in￿ ation and the output gap that is considered in making interest rate decisions. Hence,
adding the exchange rate as an additional variable to the interest rate rule will only give
a marginal improvement (if any) to the basic simple version of the interest rate rule.
Finally, although varying in terms of its magnitude, the estimate of the smoothing para-
meter (￿i) is fairly high in all cases (ranging from 0.53 to 0.85). This ￿nding indicates that
monetary policy appears to be relatively persistent and subject to some inertia. That is,
typically only less than half of the changes in the target interest rate are re￿ ected in the
changes in the actual interest rate. This ￿nding con￿rms that the monetary authorities in
the ASEAN-5 countries (although with varying degree) prefer to smooth the adjustments
in their interest rate.
5.2 A closer look at individual cases
Results presented in Table 1 are obtained using the entire sample period for this study.
As discussed in Section 2, most of the countries under consideration experience shifts in
their monetary policy regime during the sample period. To have a better picture about
this issue, we look further at individual country cases and see if the shift is re￿ ected in
the data.
To study the individual country cases, we begin by looking at the potential changes in
monetary policy regime around the dates discussed in Section 2. Indonesia and Malaysia
shift their monetary policy regime right after the Asian ￿nancial crisis hit the economy.
The Philippines changes its policy regime in 1995. Thailand moves on to adopting the
in￿ ation targeting framework in 2000. Unlike its neighbours, Singapore￿ s monetary policy
regime has been constant throughout the sample period. In order to assess the possibility
of changes in behaviour, the PRFs are re-estimated by using the sub sample that ends or
begins around those dates. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 indicates that, except for the case of Indonesia, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence
between the PRF estimate from the whole sample period and the one obtained from the
sub sample considered. In the case of the Philippines, all parameter estimates from the
25The results for this exercise are shown in Table 12 in Appendix B.
19Table 2: Estimated parameters for the subsample period
Country Sub sample ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
Indonesia: (1989-1997) -0.16 - - 3.40 0.66 0.69 3.24
(2:90) - - (0:60) (0:11) [0:78]
(1998-2004) -2.73 1.78 1.04 - 0.52 0.85 2.99
(1:55) (0:11) (0:48) - (0:03) [0:70]
Malaysia: (1989-1997) 1.01 1.54 0.17 - 0.63 0.72 1.73
(2:18) (0:58) (0:13) - (0:08) [0:88]
Philippines (1995-2004) 0.06 0.66 1.31 - 0.53 0.42 4.16
(0:01) (0:23) (0:72) - (0:11) [0:13]
Thailand (1994-1999) -3.58 2.60 0.13 - 0.69 0.86 2.86
(1:02) (0:29) (0:34) - (0:03) [0:83]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for J-test.
sub sample under consideration are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from their point estimate
counterparts obtained from the whole sample period. For the case of Malaysia, the con-
stant term (￿i) remains insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and the rest of the parameters
are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from their respective point estimates reported in Table 1.
A similar case is also observed for Thailand, where the output gap remains to enter the
PRF insigni￿cantly. Another interesting observation out of the exercise based on the sub
sample period is that exchange rate remains directly insigni￿cant in explaining changes
in the interest rate for all of the three cases above. Inclusion of exchange rate explicitly
in the extended PRF, as in equation (5), does not produce signi￿cant parameter esti-
mates for that particular variable.26 Based on those ￿ndings, we conclude that during the
sample period under consideration the available data does not suggest the existence of a
signi￿cant break in the behaviour of monetary policy for those countries. In other words,
although changes in monetary policy regime have been conceptually introduced within the
sample period, the behaviour in conducting monetary policy in Thailand, Malaysia and
the Philippines does not appear to change signi￿cantly.
The case of Indonesia is slightly di⁄erent from three of its neighbouring economies dis-
cussed above. In this case, the estimation using di⁄erent sub samples (pre and post-crisis
samples) produces signi￿cantly di⁄erent point estimates of the PRF parameters. When
the post-crisis period is considered, in￿ ation enters the function with a larger parame-
ter magnitude and the output gap also enters the function signi￿cantly with a coe¢ cient
magnitude around one. When the pre-crisis period is considered, neither in￿ ation nor the
output gap enters the function signi￿cantly. For this period, estimation of the extended
PRF as in equation (5), by including changes in the exchange rate, also shows that the pa-
rameters for both in￿ ation and output are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. However,
changes in the exchange rate signi￿cantly a⁄ect the movement in interest rate. This last
￿nding con￿rms the crawling peg regime adopted by the Indonesian monetary authority
in the pre-crisis period. The interest smoothing parameter for both sub samples remains
to be insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from the point estimate obtained from the whole sample es-
26The results are presented in Table 13 in Appendix B.
20timation. Note, however, the point estimate for ￿i in the pre-crisis sub sample is relatively
higher than the one obtained under the whole sample estimation.
The above ￿ndings suggest that in the case of Indonesia, there is an indication of a
signi￿cant shift in the way monetary policy is conducted in that country. The data suggests
that changes in the SBI rate during the pre-crisis period are mainly driven by changes in
the exchange rate. On the other hand, after the crisis, the SBI rate in Indonesia is
mainly driven by both in￿ ation and the output gap. This signi￿es the policy shifts from a
(crawling) peg exchange rate regime to a Taylor type rule in conducting monetary policy.
We need to note that Thailand also adopted a pegged exchange rate regime in the pre-
crisis period. However, unlike the case of Indonesia, the Baht value against the US dollar
was announced and defended on a daily basis rather than being determined annually.
The board of the BoT evaluated the domestic economic situation before deciding the
preferred value of the currency and kept it ￿xed within a day. Therefore, the exchange
rate management adopted by the BoT at that time looks more like the one adopted by
Singapore rather than Indonesia. This may be a reason why we do not observe signi￿cant
changes in monetary policy behaviour in the Thai data as is observed in the Indonesian
data.
Singapore is the only country that is likely to have a constant monetary policy regime
throughout the sample period. As reported in Table 1, the best ￿t for our GMM estimation
is obtained at in￿ ation forecast horizon (n) equal to zero. Parrado (2004) estimates a
variant of a Taylor type rule with changes in the TWI of exchange rate as the operating
target variable and prefers n = 3 (nine month forecast horizon in in￿ ation) for representing
the policy reaction function in Singapore. If the Parrado result is taken as valid, then
based on the argument represented by equation (3), the corresponding counterpart for the
interest rule would be the one with n = 4. To reconcile this issue, we compare the point
estimates of the parameters for the two functions as reported in Table 10 of Appendix
B. Magnitude of all the estimated parameters for both the PRF with n = 0 and n = 4
are insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from each other. Therefore, both in￿ ation and the output gap
enter the policy reaction function similarly, regardless of the choice of the forecasting time
horizon for in￿ ation.
Figure 1 compares the actual movement in the interest rate with the implied target rate
obtained from our estimation. The implied target rate series are calculated from the
estimated parameters after disallowing for partial adjustment. Therefore, it is calculated
based on the functional form described in equation (4), characterised by the estimated
parameters. That is, the estimates for the implied target rate are calculated using the
equation for a simple rule, characterised by the estimated parameters of ￿i;￿1;￿2 and
￿3 for each country.
There is an advantage from conducting this exercise relative to plotting the ￿tted model
against the actual interest rate. While the ￿tted models are able to track the actual
interest rate more closely (as is obvious from their high adjusted R2 values), they allow
for inertia to take place in determining the values of the ￿tted series. As a consequence,
they conceal the information about the importance of the determinants of the monetary
policy stance. By disallowing this e⁄ect, the exercise carried out in Figure 1 provides
21a way to reveal information about how well the determinants of monetary policy track
movements in the actual interest rate.
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In most cases the implied target rates are, interestingly, able to capture the actual rate
movements quite well. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two series is relatively high
and positive in most of the cases; i.e. 0.9 for the case of Indonesia, 0.85 for the case of
Malaysia, 0.79 for the case of the Philippines, 0.89 for the case of Thailand and 0.44 for
the case of Singapore. These positive and typically high correlation coe¢ cients signal that
both the actual interest rate and the implied target rate are relatively closely associated.
That is, movements in one series are typically followed by movements in the other series
with the same direction and a relatively similar proportion. In other words, the simple
rule characterised by our PRF estimation tends to be reasonably good in explaining the
monetary policy stance of the countries under consideration.
As seen in the ￿gure for Indonesia￿ s SBI rate, the implied target rate for this case tracks the
actual movement in SBI rate very well along the sample period. The implied target rate
in this case is calculated as a combination of the two di⁄erent simple reaction functions
reported in Table 2; that is, based on a pure exchange rate targeting regime up to the
second quarter of 1997 (right before the crisis hit the country) and based on the simple
Taylor type rule for the rest of the sample period. In the absence of the inertial adjustment
22process, both the pre and post-crisis implied target rate are able to capture the general
swings of the SBI rate very well. At the onset of the 1997 crisis, the target rate shoots up
well above the actual SBI rate and drops ahead of the actual SBI rate right after the peak
of the crisis. This suggests that during that particular period, the interest rate smoothing
behaviour is playing a fairly signi￿cant role in toning down the ￿ uctuation of the SBI rate.
In general, however, monetary policy in Indonesia is mainly driven by the change in the
exchange rate during the pre-crisis period and by both in￿ ation and output during the
post-crisis period. In the post-crisis period, the role of in￿ ation dominates the output gap
in setting the monetary policy. However, a great deal of consideration of the position of
the output gap is also in place (￿2 ￿ 1). This ￿nding is understandable considering that
the country is still struggling with the recovery process from the impact of its 1997-98
crisis.
The implied target rate series for the case of Malaysia is generated using the simple rule as
described in equation (4), characterised by the relevant parameter estimates reported in
Table 1. Figure 1 shows that in the absence of the partial adjustment process the target
rate for Malaysia captures the general ￿ uctuations in the TB discount rate quite well.
However, a noticeable gap between the two series arose during 1994. The sharp decline
in Malaysia￿ s actual rate in 1994 is not accompanied by a similar movement in the target
rate. The main reason for this sharp decline is the large in￿ ow of short-term foreign capital
into the country.27 The Malaysian Ringgit at that time was considered undervalued, but
BNM did not allow it to appreciate by intervening in the foreign market. BNM did a
sterilised intervention to keep the Ringgit value intact. In spite of this, the amount of
liquidity in￿ ows at that time was so large that some of them managed to ￿nd their way to
the domestic money market, inducing an excess liquidity in the economy, hence, forcing
the actual interest rate to fall. To mop up this excess liquidity, BNM later responded by
borrowing heavily in the money market, introducing Bank Negara Bills and raising the
statutory reserve requirement. This response eventually managed to restore the interest
rate to be in line with the implied target rate. These incidents were not captured by the
simple rule since they did not alter in￿ ation expectation and the output gap by much
at that time. Therefore, while the actual rate plummeted to around three per cent per
annum, the target rate stayed ￿ uctuating around six per cent per annum.
Another relatively noticeable gap is shown in the period during which the BNM was exer-
cising selective capital controls and a ￿xed exchange rate regime after the crisis. Although
it does not appear to be as dramatic as observed in 1994, the implied target rate ￿ uc-
tuates quite signi￿cantly around the relatively steady actual rate in that period. Those
two noticeable deviations, however, are somewhat eliminated once we allow for the partial
adjustment in the policy reaction function. The ￿tted model shows a sharp decline in
1994 and its ￿ uctuation around the actual rate in the post crisis sample appears to be
signi￿cantly more moderate. Although the interest rate smoothing behaviour occasionally
dominates the direction of monetary policy, expected in￿ ation and the output gap are, by
and large, found to be acting as the main driver for monetary policy in Malaysia during
the sample period considered. The setting of monetary policy is dominated by changes in
27See Bank Negara Malaysia (1999).
23in￿ ation expectation with a relatively small weight put on changes in the output gap.
Unlike most of its neighbouring ASEAN nations, the Philippines was not severely a⁄ected
by the 1997 ￿nancial crisis. This feature distinguishes the country from most of its neigh-
bours in terms of the heavily tightened monetary policy at the onset of the crisis. When
the whole period estimates of parameters are used to characterise the construction of the
implied target rate series, Figure 1 shows its relative ability to capture the general swings
in the actual rate. The only apparent disagreement between the two series arises in the
beginning of 1995, when the new monetary policy framework is introduced. The target
rate rises while the actual Manila reference rate falls at that time. This situation may take
place due to the adjustment process to the adoption of the new framework. Generally, the
estimated PRF does a good job in tracking the actual movement of the interest rate. It
further indicates that the monetary policy setting in the Philippines is driven by changes
in both the output gap and expected in￿ ation. The point estimate of the parameters
suggests that the output gap in this case dominates in￿ ation expectation in terms of the
weight considered when setting monetary policy. Although di⁄erent from its neighbouring
economies, this ￿nding may be justi￿ed considering that the Philippines economy is more
unstable relative to its neighbours.
The MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) adopted a unique monetary policy frame-
work by centering on exchange rate management rather than managing the money supply
or interest rate. In general, our PRF approximation using the interest rate as the policy
variable agrees with the one using changes in TWI of exchange rate reported by Parrado
(2004). Both the PRF versions agree that the monetary policy in Singapore is essentially
a⁄ected by in￿ ation and the output gap. A slight disagreement, however, comes in the
relative weight between in￿ ation and the output gap in the PRF. While relative weight
between them in the interest rule version is close to unity, the magnitude is about four in
the TWI rule version. This distinction may arise due to di⁄erences in how interest rate
and TWI of exchange rate react upon changes in in￿ ation expectation and the output gap.
A more remarkable ￿nding, however, is that both versions of PRF come up with virtually
the same very high partial adjustment parameter. This agreement suggests a relatively
robust ￿nding that the conduct of monetary policy in Singapore in strongly driven by
inertia. This feature clearly emerges when we compare the series of actual interest rate
and the series of implied target rate. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two series
is relatively low (0:44) compared to the other economies in the sample. The Singapore
case in Figure 1 also shows that although the implied target rate is relatively good in
capturing the general direction of the swings in the actual rate, the target series deviate
quite profoundly from the actual series, particularly during the post-crisis episode. All
of those wide swings, however, die out once one lets the partial adjustment mechanism
a⁄ect the determination of the interest rate. These observations suggest that although the
monetary policy setting in Singapore is signi￿cantly a⁄ected by in￿ ation and the output
gap, it is in principle dominated by the partial adjustment mechanism. That is, while
in￿ ation and the output gap are playing a role in determining the direction of monetary
policy, the process itself is mainly dominated by inertia.
As reported earlier in Tables 1 and 2, the estimate of ￿2 (the parameter measuring the
24sensitivity to the output gap) for the case of Thailand is relatively small and insigni￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. It, therefore, suggests that the Bank of Thailand has e⁄ectively
been managing its policy by relying solely on developments in the forecast of in￿ ation.
Depending on the de￿nition used, this situation may or may not be interpreted as BoT
e⁄ectively pursuing a pure in￿ ation targeting.28 Nevertheless, the implied target rate for
the case of Thailand is calculated by setting ￿2 = 0. The high correlation coe¢ cient
between the implied target rate and the actual repo rate (0.89) indicates that the former
is capturing the direction of changes in the latter very well. The most striking feature in
the Thailand panel of Figure 1 is that the target rate correctly captures the magnitude of
changes in the actual rate during the course of the crisis. O⁄ the crisis period, although
the direction for changes in actual repo rate is still driven by in￿ ation expectation, its
movement is largely a⁄ected by inertia. In the period leading to the crisis for example,
had the monetary policy was solely driven by in￿ ation expectation, the actual rate should
have been set at a notably higher rate. Overall, the ￿ndings suggest that the monetary
policy setting in Thailand is e⁄ectively driven only by in￿ ation expectation, with obvious
preference over an adoption of interest smoothing adjustment mechanism.
In summary, the exercise conducted in this subsection has pointed out that the policy
feedback rule represented by a simple interest rate reaction function can generally be
used to represent the conduct of monetary policy in our sample countries. Although
changes in monetary policy management are reported, the behaviour in setting up the
monetary policy is typically unchanged, with Indonesia as a particular exception in this
case. Expected in￿ ation and the output gap are typically acting as the main driver of
monetary policy in the ￿ve ASEAN economies considered. The way those important
economic variables dictated the setting of monetary policy, however, is typically moderated
by the existence of interest rate smoothing mechanism adopted by the monetary authority.
Singapore is the case where this e⁄ect is found to be strongest.
6 Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper is to approximate the basis of how monetary policy is set in
the sample of ￿ve ASEAN economies. This is done by examining simple monetary policy
reaction functions over a past of one and a half decade. Although the primary objective
of monetary policy in the sample countries is mainly focused on price stabilisation, the
conduct of monetary policy in most of the sample economies during the period under
examination has been reported as undergoing variation in terms of the way their monetary
policy is being managed. This paper takes account of the issue by dividing the sample
period into sub-samples marked by the dates when variations are reported to be taking
place.
The ￿ndings suggest that the conduct of monetary policy in the sample of developing
economies considered in the paper can, in principle, be explained by a simple monetary
28According to the de￿nition used by Clarida et al. (1998), in￿ ation targeting regime is de￿ned as a
regime where the nominal interest rates are raised su¢ ciently to increase real rates whenever expected
in￿ ation goes above its target. Svensson (1999), however argues that this is not the precise interpretation
of in￿ ation targeting.
25policy reaction function. That is, the sample economies seem to be quite consistently
following a certain rule in setting their monetary policy. Three general observations emerge
from the ￿ndings. First, the estimated policy reaction functions are doing a reasonable job
in explaining the setting of monetary policy of the sample economies, in the sense that they
are capturing movements in the actual interest data very well. They further indicate that
the conduct of monetary policy has typically supported the price stabilisation objective
of the monetary authorities of most economies under consideration; i.e. the coe¢ cient of
the nominal interest rate on in￿ ation is typically greater than unity. In other words, the
nominal rates are raised su¢ ciently to increase the real rates whenever expected in￿ ation
goes above target. Therefore, monetary policy reacts to expected in￿ ation and tends to
stabilise ￿ uctuations in both in￿ ation and output.
Second, although moderated by an interest rate partial adjustment mechanism, the di-
rections in the setting of monetary policy in the sample countries are mainly driven by
movement of the in￿ ation expectation with typically some allowance for output stabili-
sation. With regard to the debate about the importance of an exchange rate variable in
driving monetary policy of the small open economy, our ￿ndings suggest that exchange
rate does not direct the setting of interest rates explicitly. It is, however, acting to be
part of the important background information utilised by the central bank in determining
monetary policy stance.
Third, albeit the fact that changes in monetary policy regime have been conceptually
introduced within the sample period, the behaviour in conducting monetary policy in
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines does not appear to change signi￿cantly. However,
in the case of Indonesia, the ￿ndings indicate a signi￿cant shift in the conduct of monetary
policy. The country seems to have signi￿cantly switched its monetary policy orientation
from being mainly driven by changes in the exchange rate into being directed by in￿ ation
expectation and the cyclical variable.
The individual assessment of the approximate conduct of monetary policy in each country
is summarised as follows. Monetary policy in Indonesia within the sample period has
experienced a switch from a pure exchange rate targeting regime to a regime that is con-
sistent with the Taylor principle, but with particular attention to output stabilisation. In
Malaysia, the conduct of monetary policy over the sample period has mainly been consis-
tent with the Taylor principle with a relatively small allowance for output stabilisation.
The case of Thailand suggests that the country has e⁄ectively been focusing only at the
forecast of in￿ ation in setting up its monetary policy during the sample period. However,
the regime tends to be highly driven by inertia in the o⁄-crisis sample. Monetary policy
in Singapore is mainly driven by inertia. That is, although expected in￿ ation and the out-
put gap signal directions for the setting of Singapore￿ s monetary policy, the interest rate
adjusts very slowly to its projected target level. Finally, monetary policy in the case of
the Philippines is found to put more weight on output stabilisation and marginally fails to
follow the Taylor principle. This ￿nding may be justi￿ed considering that the Philippines
economy is more unstable relative to the other four economies considered in this paper.
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29APPENDIX
A Data description and sources
Variable Country Description Source
Interest rate Indonesia Quarterly average of 30 days SBI
(Bank Indonesia certi￿cate) rate
CEIC Asia database; ID:SBI Rate: Auc-
tion Target: 30 Days
Malaysia Quarterly average of 3-month TB
(treasury bills) rate
CEIC Asia database; MY: Discount Rate
3 Month: Treasury Bills
Philippines Quarterly average of 90-days of
Manila reference rate
CEIC Asia database; PH: Manila Refer-
ence Rate 90
Singapore Quarterly average of 3-month in-
terbank rate
CEIC Asia database; SG: Interbank Rate:
SGD: Month End: 3 Month
Thailand Quarterly average of 14-days repo
rate
CEIC Asia database; TH: Repurchase
Rate: Month Average: 14 Day
Price index Indonesia Quarterly CPI (consumer price in-
dex); 1993=100
CEIC Asia database; ID: Consumer Price
Index
Malaysia Quarterly CPI (consumer price in-
dex); 2000=100
CEIC Asia database; MY: Consumer Price
Index (CPI)
Philippines Quarterly CPI (consumer price in-
dex); 1988=100
CEIC Asia database; PH: Consumer Price
Index
Singapore Quarterly CPI (consumer price in-
dex); 2004=100
CEIC Asia database; SG: Consumer Price
Index
Thailand Quarterly CPI (consumer price in-
dex); 2000=100
CEIC Asia database; TH: Consumer Price
Index
Output Indonesia Quarterly real GDP (gross domes-
tic product) at 1993 prices
1988-1992: Bank Indonesia; 1993-2004:
CEIC Asia database; ID: Gross Domestic
Product (GDP): 1993p
Malaysia Quarterly real GDP (gross domes-
tic product) at 1987 prices
1988-1990: Bank Negara Malaysia; 1991-
2004: CEIC Asia database: MY: Gross
Domestic Product (GDP): 1987p
Philippines Quarterly real GDP (gross domes-
tic product) at 1985 prices
CEIC Asia database; PH: Gross Domestic
Product (GDP): 1985p
Singapore Seasonally adjusted quarterly real
GDP at 1995 prices
CEIC Asia database; SG: Gross Domestic
Product: 95p: sa
Thailand Quarterly real GDP (gross domes-
tic product) at 1988 prices
CEIC Asia database; TH: Gross Domestic
Product (GDP): 1988p
Exchange rate Indonesia Quarterly average of US dollar ex-
change rate
CEIC Asia database; ID: Spot FX Rate:
Bank Indonesia: Rupiah to USD
Malaysia Quarterly index of REER (real ef-
fective exchange rate) based on rel-
ative CPI
IFS (International Financial Statistics);
548..RECZF...
Philippines Quarterly index of REER based on
relative CPI
IFS (International Financial Statistics);
566..RECZF...
Singapore Quarterly index of REER based on
relative CPI
IFS (International Financial Statistics);
576..RECZF...
Thailand Quarterly average of US dollar ex-
change rate
CEIC Asia database; TH: Forex: Thai
Baht to US Dollar: Mid
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Note: The stock of capital is calculated by the perpetual inventory method (PIM) using
1969 as the base period.
31A.1 Interest rate
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Table 3: Stationarity tests for interest rates: 1989-2004







Indonesia3 -2.63 0.09 5 0.10 0.46 0.35
Malaysia4 -3.60 0.04 3 0.11 0.15 0.12
Philippines4 -3.30 0.07 4 0.11 0.15 0.12
Singapore4 -3.11 0.11 1 0.08 0.15 0.12
Thailand4 -3.16 0.10 2 0.11 0.15 0.12
Notes: 1. Bandwith selection is conducted by Newey-West using Bartlett kernel.
2. Based on Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992).
3. Includes intercept in the test.
4. Includes intercept and trend in the test.
32A.2 In￿ ation rates
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Table 4: Stationarity tests for annual in￿ ation rates: 1989-2004







Indonesia3 -5.62 0.00 1 0.12 0.46 0.74
Malaysia4 -3.41 0.06 1 0.15 0.15 0.22
Philippines4 -4.07 0.01 5 0.07 0.15 0.22
Singapore4 -3.70 0.03 1 0.09 0.15 0.22
Thailand4 -3.24 0.09 1 0.10 0.15 0.22
Notes: 1. Bandwith selection is conducted by Newey-West using Bartlett kernel.
2. Based on Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992).
3. Includes intercept in the test.
4. Includes intercept and trend in the test.
33A.3 Annual change in the exchage rates
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Table 5: Stationarity tests for annual changes in the exchange rates: 1989-2004







Indonesia3 -4.68 0.00 1 0.09 0.46 0.74
Malaysia3 -4.24 0.001 1 0.07 0.46 0.74
Philippines3 -4.57 0.00 1 0.26 0.46 0.74
Singapore4 -4.08 0.01 6 0.05 0.15 0.22
Thailand3 -5.07 0.00 1 0.11 0.46 0.74
Notes: 1. Bandwith selection is conducted by Newey-West using Bartlett kernel.
2. Based on Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992).
3. Includes intercept in the test.
4. Includes intercept and trend in the test.
34A.4 Output gap measures
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Table 6: Stationarity tests for output gap measures: 1989-2004







Indonesia3 -5.71 0.00 1 0.04 0.46 0.74
Malaysia3 -3.41 0.00 1 0.07 0.46 0.74
Philippines3 -2.24 0.02 0 0.12 0.46 0.74
Singapore3 -3.75 0.00 1 0.06 0.46 0.74
Thailand3 -3.23 0.002 0 0.06 0.46 0.74
Notes: 1. Bandwith selection is conducted by Newey-West using Bartlett kernel.
2. Based on Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992).
3. No intercept and trend in the test.
35B Baseline estimation results
Table 7: Indonesia reaction function (1989-2004)
Alternative Horizons ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
n = 0 7.99 0.81 -0.35 -0.31 0.822 2.99
(1:45) (0:07) (0:32) (0:24) [0:70]
n = 1 4.18 1.15 -0.24 0.536 0.893 2.63
(1:62) (0:11) (0:45) (0:05) [0:75]
n = 2 -2.62 1.79 -2.22 0.83 0.865 4.19
(4:71) (0:44) (1:73) (0:05) [0:52]
n = 3 -10.31 2.88 -2.16 0.77 0.640 3.54
(8:43) (0:98) (1:40) (0:03) [0:62]
n = 4 -98.13 13.25 -2.74 0.94 0.184 4.02
(135:43) (15:44) (3:38) (0:05) [0:55]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
3. Target horizons for the output gap are ￿xed at m = 0.
4. The set of instruments includes: lag 1 and 2 of in￿ ation; lag 1 and 4 of output gap;
lag 1 and 2 of real USD exchange rate; and lag 1 to 3 of interest rate.
5. The covariances are prewhitened and weighted by applying a Bartlett kernel and
￿xed Newey-West method to determine the bandwith selection.
36Table 8: Malaysia reaction function (1989-2004)
Alternative Horizons ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
n = 0 0.71 1.60 0.17 0.68 0.866 3.63
(0:32) (0:10) (0:08) (0:12) [0:60]
n = 1 0.56 1.66 0.19 0.69 0.873 4.31
(0:39) (0:12) (0:05) (0:076) [0:51]
n = 2 0.38 1.75 0.10 0.71 0.867 3.77
(0:52) (0:165) (0:08) (0:09) [0:58]
n = 3 0.10 1.83 -0.15 0.69 0.837 4.71
(0:15) (0:24) (0:096) (0:15) [0:45]
n = 4 1.33 1.68 -0.41 0.89 0.826 6.17
(4:45) (0:79) (0:33) (0:23) [0:29]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
3. Target horizons for the output gap are ￿xed at m = 0.
4. The set of instruments includes: lag 1 and 2 of in￿ ation; lag 1 and 4 of output gap
and real e⁄ective exchange rate; and lag 2 and 4 of interest rate.
5. The covariances are prewhitened and weighted by applying a Bartlett kernel and
￿xed Newey-West method to determine the bandwith selection.
Table 9: Philippines reaction function (1989-2004)
Alternative Horizons ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
n = 0 0.07 0.59 1.40 0.57 0.779 1.27
(0:01) (0:12) (0:59) (0:10) [0:53]
n = 1 0.07 0.72 1.22 0.55 0.791 3.02
(0:01) (0:18) (0:60) (0:12) [0:22]
n = 2 0.06 0.76 1.15 0.57 0.791 6.34
(0:015) (0:19) (0:56) (0:12) [0:04]
n = 3 0.13 -0.34 5.12 0.87 0.742 8.74
(0:10) (1:52) (5:24) (0:11) [0:01]
n = 4 0.11 0.05 3.84 0.84 0.754 10.41
(0:06) (0:80) (2:63) (0:09) [0:005]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
3. Target horizons for the output gap are ￿xed at m = 0.
4. The set of instruments includes: lag 1 and 2 of in￿ ation; lag 4 of output gap;
lag 2 of real e⁄ective exchange rate; and lag 1 to 2 of interest rate.
5. The covariances are prewhitened and weighted by applying a Bartlett kernel and
Andrews parametric method to determine the bandwith selection.
37Table 10: Singapore reaction function (1989-2004)
Alternative Horizons ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
n = 0 0.82 1.27 0.94 0.85 0.879 6.80
(0:87) (0:49) (0:46) (0:05) [0:34]
n = 1 1.21 0.90 0.755 0.83 0.874 5.80
(0:77) (0:43) (0:39) (0:06) [0:45]
n = 2 1.42 0.71 0.90 0.845 0.869 5.94
(0:88) (0:49) (0:46) (0:06) [0:43]
n = 3 1.50 0.68 0.98 0.85 0.867 6.47
(0:905) (0:50) (0:43) (0:05) [0:37]
n = 4 1.12 0.95 1.07 0.85 0.871 7.43
(0:89) (0:50) (0:41) (0:05) [0:28]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
3. Target horizons for the output gap are ￿xed at m = 0:
4. The set of instruments includes: lag 1 and 4 of in￿ ation; lag 1 and 4 of output gap;
lag 1 and 2 of real e⁄ective exchange rate; and lag 1 to 4 of interest rate.
5. The covariances are prewhitened and weighted by applying a Bartlett kernel and
Andrews parametric method to determine the bandwith selection.
Table 11: Thailand reaction function (1994-2004)
Alternative Horizons ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
n = 0 -0.37 1.865 0.34 0.84 0.848 5.08
(2:25) (0:92) (0:58) (0:10) [0:53]
n = 1 -2.82 2.65 0.575 0.76 0.884 4.55
(1:46) (0:51) (0:33) (0:06) [0:60]
n = 2 -1.56 2.04 0.18 0.73 0.911 4.69
(0:78) (0:25) (0:21) (0:04) [0:58]
n = 3 -3.61 2.65 0.09 0.70 0.917 4.13
(0:82) (0:30) (0:24) (0:04) [0:66]
n = 4 -4.34 2.74 -0.41 0.68 0.882 6.77
(4:45) (0:48) (0:42) (0:05) [0:34]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
3. Target horizons for the output gap are ￿xed at m = 0:
4. The set of instruments includes: lag 1 and 3 of in￿ ation; lag 1, 2 and 4 of output
gap; lag 1 and 2 of real USD exchange rate; and lag 1 to 3 of interest rate.
5. The covariances are prewhitened and weighted by applying a Bartlett kernel and
Andrews parametric method to determine the bandwith selection.
38Table 12: Parameters for the estimates of the extended policy reaction function
Country ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
Indonesia 4.10 1.17 -0.26 -0.01 0.52 0.892 2.60
(1:79) (0:19) (0:56) (0:10) (0:08) [0:63]
Malaysia 0.52 1.64 0.13 0.03 0.61 0.868 3.52
(0:40) (0:12) (0:07) (0:03) (0:17) [0:47]
Philippines 0.07 0.71 1.39 -0.04 0.56 0.776 2.10
(0:01) (0:16) (0:68) (0:05) (0:12) [0:15]
Singapore 0.47 1.49 0.91 -0.25 0.86 0.869 5.24
(1:37) (1:00) (0:59) (0:38) (0:07) [0:39]
Thailand -2.14 2.31 0.16 0.01 0.75 0.918 2.38
(1:30) (0:36) (0:21) (0:01) (0:05) [0:79]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
Table 13: Estimated parameters for the extended speci￿cation in the subsample period
Country Sub sample ￿i ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿i Adj. R2 J ￿ test
Indonesia: (1998-2004) -3.75 1.92 1.19 -0.06 0.47 0.82 2.50
(1:79) (0:15) (0:45) (0:08) (0:08) [0:64]
Malaysia: (1989-1997) 1.01 1.53 0.17 0.00 0.62 0.71 1.75
(2:17) (0:58) (0:13) (0:06) (0:14) [0:78]
Philippines (1995-2004) 0.07 0.44 0.78 0.06 0.34 0.50 1.91
(0:01) (0:17) (0:51) (0:03) (0:14) [0:17]
Thailand (1994-1999) 1.68 1.60 0.10 0.02 0.71 0.85 1.93
(4:70) (0:93) (0:21) (0:02) (0:05) [0:86]
Note: 1. Numbers in brackets are the relevant standard errors.
2. Numbers in square brackets are the p-values for the J-test.
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